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With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain change-in-control 
payments (also known as “golden parachutes”) by giving shareholders the right 
to approve or disapprove such payments on an advisory basis. This Essay is the 
first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute 
(“SOGP”) vote. We find that unlike shareholder votes on proposed mergers, there 
is a significant amount of variation with respect to votes on golden parachutes. 
Notwithstanding the variation, however, the SOGP voting regime is likely 
ineffective in controlling golden parachute (“GP”) compensation. First, proxy 
advisors seem more likely to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to 
recommendations on SOGP votes. Second, shareholders are more likely to 
adhere to advisor recommendations. Finally, the size of golden parachutes 
appears to be increasing in the years since the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act 
in 2010, and the golden parachutes that are amended immediately prior to 
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SOGP votes tend to grow rather than shrink. These findings contrast with the 
research that has examined Say on Pay (“SOP”), and we suggest that the 
differences between the two regimes lie in the absence of second-stage, market-
based discipline for SOGP votes. We offer potential avenues for improving 
SOGP’s ability to shape change-in-control compensation practices, such as 
making SOGP votes (partially) binding, and making the GP payment and 
SOGP voting information more readily available to shareholders of 
corporations where the target directors also serve as directors of acquiring 
corporations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since executive compensation became a highly salient political 
issue in the 1980s, the federal government has repeatedly attempted to 
influence pay setting for top managers at public companies. From tax 
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nudges1 to mandatory clawbacks2 to enhanced disclosure 
requirements,3 the regulatory interventions have been steady but of 
uncertain impact.4 In more recent times, Congress and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have tried a new mechanism, 
amplifying the voice of public company shareholders on executive 
compensation by requiring advisory shareholder votes. The two 
interventions that move in this direction, known as “Say on Pay” and 
“Say on Golden Parachute,” were promulgated under the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and promised to focus 
shareholder outrage over problematic pay practices. Say on Pay (“SOP”) 
asks shareholders to vote on the previous year’s executive pay practices 
in their entirety, while Say on Golden Parachute (“SOGP”) asks 
shareholders to vote on merger-related severance payments that would 
become payable to executives when the change in control takes place. 
SOP in the United States and its cousins around the world have 
received a good deal of attention from both practitioners and scholars.5 
To the surprise of some, a series of recent papers found that SOP, 
though advisory, influences corporate behavior to respond to negative 
 
 1. I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012) (amended 2017) (removing the exception to the deduction cap 
for executive compensation of $1 million for performance-based pay, as part of the 2017 corporate 
tax overhaul); I.R.C. § 280G(a) (2012) (excluding compensation deductions for excess golden 
parachutes); I.R.C. § 4999(a) (2012) (imposing an excise tax for excess golden parachute 
payments); see also Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 514 (2009). 
 2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 954, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
4 (2012) (“The Commission shall, by rule, direct the national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that does not comply with 
the requirements of this section.”). The SEC has issued a Proposed Rule. See Listing Standards for 
Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,144 (proposed July 14, 2015) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 274) (proposing to amend § 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010). 
 3. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2019); Executive Compensation and Related Person 
Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 
245, 249, 274) (stating that the disclosure amendments would be effective November 7, 2006). 
 4. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive 
Compensation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 11, 11 (Randall S. Thomas & Jennifer 
G. Hill eds., 2012) (“The emerging conclusion is that attempts to regulate CEO pay [including tax 
interventions] have been mostly unblemished by success.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy 
Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951 (2013); Fabrizio Ferri & David Maber, 
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527 (2013); Jill 
Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm 
Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101 (2018); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes 
on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009) 
(expressing concern that Say on Pay may cause a wealth-decreasing homogenization of pay 
practices); Stephen Davis, Does “Say on Pay” Work? Lessons on Making CEO Compensation 
Accountable (2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/sites/ 
default/files/content/docs/Policy%20Briefing%20No%201%20’Say%20on%20Pay’.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SD6Z-4T9B].  
Choi_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:28 AM 
226 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1:223 
shareholder votes.6 At least some of the studies also present a sanguine 
picture of proxy advisor recommendations as well as shareholder voting 
itself.7 In short, SOP appears to be influencing executive annual pay 
practices (at least partially) in line with the hopes of those who 
advocated for its adoption. 
In this paper, we look at the other “Say on” compensation 
provision in Dodd-Frank. Utilizing hand-collected data on golden 
parachutes (“GPs”), we analyze the first six years of experience with 
SOGP votes to answer questions surrounding this expansion of 
shareholder power: how proxy advisors have responded to the new vote, 
how shareholders utilize this new power, and how effective the law has 
been in influencing pay practices. Our central finding is that SOGP does 
not function like SOP and, in fact, may be substantially less effective. 
On the surface, this is surprising since both voting rules share 
strikingly similar characteristics. Both were enacted via the same 
legislation and rulemaking process.8 Both rely on advisory voting by the 
same groups of shareholders, who are advised by the same proxy 
advisors.9 Both cover highly public and controversial matters of 
executive pay. 
Yet important differences separate the two. Because SOP is an 
advisory vote,10 its impact necessarily relies on indirect pressures 
placed on corporate directors. Most commonly, this entails an implicit 
or explicit threat to subsequently remove directors or discipline 
 
 6. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 126–28 (discussing the influence of SOP on corporate 
boards and concerns that it may cause boards to focus on short-term metrics to the detriment of 
long-term value).  
 7. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 952–56 (describing the study on shareholder 
voting, finding that the resulting data were “[c]ontrary to critics’ concerns,” and suggesting that 
the proxy advisors do not seem to be making one-size-fits-all recommendations and the 
shareholders do not seem to be just rubber-stamping the recommendations); see also Randall S. 
Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a Greater 
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213 (2012) (evaluating pre-
Dodd-Frank experiments on SOP). 
 8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 9. There are a small number of proxy advisor firms, which, among others, make 
recommendations to institutional shareholders (such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and Fidelity) on 
how they should exercise their voting rights. The firms include Institutional Shareholder Services 
(“ISS”), Glass Lewis, Egan Jones, and Proxy Governance. ISS is known to have the largest market 
share and the most influence. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy 
Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (finding that ISS has the most influence 
“partially due to the fact that ISS (to a greater extent than other advisors) bases its 
recommendations on factors that shareholders consider important”). 
 10. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute 
Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (“In 
addition to their non-binding status, none of the shareholder votes required pursuant to Section 
14A is to be construed ‘as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors.’ ”)). 
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executives who fail to respond to shareholder disapproval. That is, given 
that the same set of directors will likely be up for reelection the 
subsequent year and that the same set of executives remains in charge, 
the shareholders can presumably impose discipline at the subsequent 
shareholder meeting if those managers were unresponsive to the earlier 
negative shareholder reaction.11 Executives are likely to balance their 
desire for more compensation with the need to safeguard their 
relationship with shareholders who will exert influence over the firm 
going forward. 
The potential for future discipline of managers is more limited 
in the SOGP context. Directors, including the ones who approved the 
executives’ golden parachutes, will not be up for reelection by the same 
SOGP shareholders since the takeover triggering the golden parachute 
usually spells the end of the directors’ service at the firm and marks the 
advent of a vastly different shareholder base.12 Furthermore, executives 
who might be asked to renegotiate golden parachutes in the face of 
shareholder pressure may have little incentive to appease shareholders 
since their employment with the firm is usually ending as well.13 In the 
absence of any explicit or implicit disciplinary mechanism, directors 
and executives may have little or no incentive to eschew outsized 
change-in-control severance payments.14 In short, there are good 
reasons to believe that SOGP may not prove as effective as SOP in 
putting downward pressure on compensation.15 
Theory thus suggests that the effectiveness of an SOGP regime 
in constraining GPs may be compromised compared to SOP’s ability to 
constrain compensation more broadly. If so, we would expect to observe 
relatively little effect on golden parachute incidence and sizes after the 
 
 11. In fact, Dodd-Frank requires companies to disclose detailed information on how they have 
responded to the previous year’s shareholder SOP votes in the next year’s proxy. See id. at 6015 
(amending Item 402(b) to disclose how a company “considered the results of previous shareholder 
[say-on-pay] votes”). Although this is largely for informational purposes, to the extent that 
shareholders could exert indirect pressure, the information disclosure can be quite useful.  
 12. The fact that Dodd-Frank’s drafters thought it unnecessary to add an informational 
provision about management’s response to an SOGP vote (as they did for the response to an SOP 
vote) demonstrates the point. 
 13. Also, to the extent that the burden of paying severance payments is borne, at least 
partially, by the buyer, target shareholders may be less sensitive to the size of the payment. 
 14. Although the primary focus of this Essay is on change-in-control severance payments, an 
interesting comparison could be made to severance payments made to executives in a non-takeover 
context, for example, when an executive’s employment has been voluntarily or involuntarily 
terminated by the board in the absence of a takeover. In such a setting, the implicit pressure on 
the directors is presumably still in place, and empirical examination is needed to determine 
whether the presence of such indirect pressure can moderate non-change-in-control severance pay 
to the top executives. We intend to follow up on this line of research. 
 15. Indeed, every deal lawyer with whom we have spoken claims to operate as though the 
votes have no impact at all. 
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onset of SOGP. We would expect few, if any, last-minute amendments 
ahead of an SOGP vote aimed at mollifying shareholders about to vote 
on golden parachutes. Also, we would expect to observe a number of 
other dissimilarities with the SOP experience. To the extent that their 
institutional shareholder clients care less about the issue, proxy 
advisors’ recommendations may be more likely to rely on simple, one-
size-fits-all criteria so as to economize their resources. Relatedly, actual 
SOGP votes may be more highly correlated with proxy advisor 
recommendations if shareholders are less willing to expend their own 
resources to sort through the merits of SOGP votes.16 Finally, there may 
be less SOGP dissent than SOP dissent overall if shareholders perceive 
little chance of effecting a change in golden parachutes. 
This Essay empirically assesses these hypotheses in order to 
shed light on the experience with SOGP. Specifically, we aim to assess 
the basic question of SOGP’s consequentiality for golden parachute pay 
practices. In doing so, this Essay adds to the literature evaluating 
advisory votes at public companies17 and the behavior and influence of 
proxy advisory firms.18 Our empirical assessment can be divided into 
three questions. First, we examine which factors are related to (or 
possibly influence) proxy advisor recommendations. We have collected 
data on recommendations since the inception of SOGP from 
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), the dominant proxy advisory 
firm, and we find that several attributes are correlated with ISS’s SOGP 
recommendations.19 For instance, we find that the size of a golden 
parachute is significantly related to ISS’s “against” recommendations. 
Since 2013, ISS has explicitly stated that it looks for problematic 
provisions in golden parachutes—tax gross-ups, single triggers, and 
cash awards that are three or more times larger than annual pay20—
when making its recommendation decisions. Although the data are not 
readily available on whether components of the golden parachute are 
single or double triggers, we are able to at least corroborate that the 
presence of a tax gross-up provision is significantly and positively 
related to ISS’s “against” recommendations, consistent with ISS’s 
stated policy. 
 
 16. Comparing the degrees of correlation with other studies is not an easy task given that the 
empirical specifications and the questions posed may differ substantially. Hence, we do not intend 
to make an absolute claim here. 
 17. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 5. 
 18. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role 
of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (2009); Choi et al., supra note 9; Ertimur et al., supra 
note 5. 
 19. See Choi et al., supra note 9. 
 20. See infra Part I for a more detailed discussion of these attributes. 
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Second, we look to find the determinants of shareholder SOGP 
voting outcomes. Despite the lack of a strong disciplinary mechanism, 
we do find that shareholders, on occasion, vote against golden 
parachutes rather than simply rubber-stamping them.21 As to what 
determines such outcomes, we find that ISS “against” recommendations 
have by far the most explanatory power for voting and likely more than 
has been found with respect to SOP voting. While it remains difficult to 
directly compare our results with those from the SOP studies, the result 
seems to support the hypothesis that shareholders do not take SOGP 
as seriously as they do SOP.22 At the same time, the firm’s prior 
performance, as measured by the return on assets (“ROA”), also seems 
to play an independent, albeit lesser, role in determining voting 
outcomes. That is, the firms that perform better financially seem to 
attract less dissent from their shareholders. The latter result is 
consistent with existing scholarship on SOP that shows firm 
performance is correlated with voting outcomes.23 
Third and finally, we examine the effect of SOGP on golden 
parachutes. The examination is divided into two parts. First, looking at 
the broad trends in golden parachutes, we examine how they evolved 
before and after the advent of SOGP under Dodd-Frank. Even though 
SOGP itself may lack any direct disciplinary force, one possibility may 
be that SOGP puts some indirect pressure on the growth of golden 
parachutes over time. However, when we look at the absolute size of 
golden parachute obligations taken on by firms in their contracts with 
CEOs, we find that they grew at a faster rate after the adoption of 
SOGP than before, even after controlling for an extensive set of 
plausible controls including CEO compensation levels generally. When 
we look at the ratio of golden parachutes to annual compensation, on 
the other hand, we do not find any evidence of this change in the growth 
rate. At minimum, SOGP does not seem to be suppressing golden 
parachutes. Second, utilizing our hand-collected data, we look at 
changes to golden parachutes during the period one year prior to the 
 
 21. The fact that the shareholders actually express their voice on advisory SOGP, along with 
the fact that the proxy advisory firms, including ISS, make somewhat tailored recommendations 
on SOGP, raises an interesting question. Even though the advisory vote is nonbinding and there 
may be few implicit discipline mechanisms against the directors and the executives, we suspect 
that the institutional shareholders may be exercising their voting rights under SOGP so as to 
satisfy their fiduciary obligations to their own investors. This, in turn, will create an incentive to 
the proxy advisory firms to provide a few more meaningful recommendations to their own client 
base. In short, even though the votes are purely advisory and there may be no other market-based 
sanctioning mechanism, based on the institutional shareholders’ own fiduciary obligations, there 
would be some correlation between how they vote and the attributes of golden parachutes. 
 22. See supra note 16 on comparing regression coefficient estimates from different empirical 
studies. 
 23. See, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 973–78; Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 124. 
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public announcement of a deal through its closing to see if firms amend 
existing golden parachutes in anticipation of SOGP votes.24 We find 
that firms that amend golden parachutes during the run-up to a deal 
are more likely to experience increases (rather than reductions) in the 
value of the previously disclosed golden parachute promises than are 
firms that do not amend their contracts. This suggests that firms do not 
act out of fear of negative shareholder votes, contrary to the experience 
with SOP. 
Our findings suggest that SOGP may not be achieving its 
desired purpose of constraining golden parachutes. To the extent that 
one believes golden parachutes reflect arms-length bargaining among 
executives, boards that are faithful to the shareholders, and potentially, 
acquirers, this may be of little consequence. If, on the other hand, one 
believes golden parachutes are often inefficient contractual terms 
requiring regulatory intervention, this poses a problem. Based on our 
empirical findings, we suggest a few policy changes to the existing 
regime. One answer to SOGP’s inconsequentiality is to make the vote 
binding somehow. Unlike SOP votes, SOGP votes are taken before (and 
not after) the executives are to receive the severance payments. By 
making the SOGP votes binding, we can provide a more meaningful 
formal disciplinary tool to the shareholders. Another possibility is to try 
to harness the implicit, market-based discipline on the directors and the 
executives through more robust disclosure.25 We focus on two groups in 
particular: the target company directors who also serve (or expect to 
serve) as directors for other companies and the directors of the 
acquiring corporation. For instance, to the extent that the target 
company directors also serve as directors at other companies and 
approve golden parachutes that receive strong negative votes from 
target shareholders, disclosing this fact to the other companies’ 
shareholders might allow those shareholders to discipline the directors.  
 
 24. In an earlier study, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack also examine the last minute increase 
in executive compensation, either through augmentation of golden parachutes, special cash 
bonuses, or post-merger employment. Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What’s in It for 
Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 39 (2004). They show that, in cases 
where the CEOs receive such extra compensation, target shareholders’ returns from the merger 
are lower. Id. at 59. The study reflects mergers between 1995 and 1997 and thus does not consider 
the impact of SOGP. Id. at 41. They also find GP amendments in only 12% of firms during the run-
up to a deal, but they focus on the cash severance component of GPs rather than the broader 
universe of amendments that we study. Id. at 46. 
 25. A growing body of literature examines the role the law plays in facilitating reputational 
sanctions by providing relevant information to the market participants. See, e.g., Scott Baker & 
Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559 (2015) [hereinafter Baker 
& Choi, Contract’s Role]; Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly 
Legal Sanctions Can Work Better than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2018) 
[hereinafter Baker & Choi, Reputation and Litigation]. 
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The Essay is organized as follows. In Part I, we review the 
structure and practice of golden parachutes, including the recent 
legislative changes that require shareholders’ advisory votes at public 
companies facing potential changes in control. We also discuss ISS’s 
recommendation guidelines with respect to such votes. In Part II, the 
core of the Essay, we present our empirical analyses of SOGP. We start 
with a brief description of the datasets we use, along with descriptive 
statistics of the data, and present the empirical results that show: (1) 
what determines ISS’s voting recommendations; (2) how shareholders 
vote; and (3) how golden parachutes have changed over time (before and 
after the legislative change), including for those companies that expect 
an imminent change in control. Part III presents a few policy 
implications based on the empirical findings, and the last Part 
concludes with suggestions for future research. 
I. GOLDEN PARACHUTES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ ADVISORY VOTES ON 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
A. An Introduction to Golden Parachutes 
On February 4, 2015, beleaguered retailers Office Depot and 
Staples entered into a merger agreement under which Staples would 
acquire Office Depot and Office Depot shareholders would receive a 
combination of cash and Staples shares.26 If the deal was consummated, 
Office Depot’s Chairman and CEO, Roland Smith, would no longer 
serve as the top executive and would become entitled to over $47 million 
in cash, accelerated equity, and other benefits.27 Institutional 
Shareholder Services recommended its clients vote in favor of the 
merger but against management with respect to the Say-on-Golden-
Parachute vote.28 At a meeting on June 19 of the same year, the merger 
was approved by Office Depot shareholders with 447,184,660 votes for 
and 748,824 votes against, or over 99% in favor.29 On the other hand, 
the SOGP vote was met with approval by only 246,680,492 shares in 
favor as opposed to 201,100,277 against, only a 55% to 45% margin.30 
 
 26. Office Depot, Inc., Annual Proxy Statement (Schedule 14a) (May 15, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312515190524/d892614ddefm14a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5AH9-MC8K]. 
 27. See id. at 83 (setting out golden parachute compensation for Office Depot executives). 
 28. This information was derived from the ISS Company Vote Results database, one of the 
sources we used to compile data for this project. See infra Section II.A.  
 29. Office Depot, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 19, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312515230133/d945744d8k.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6UYN-3UCN]. 
 30. Id. 
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The Office Depot-Staples merger was eventually cancelled for antitrust 
reasons,31 and Smith retired soon after with a payout of less than $11 
million.32 But what caused ISS to recommend against Smith’s GP? 
What caused shareholders to vote so differently on the related 
proposals? And why did Smith and Office Depot appear to do nothing 
ahead of the SOGP vote to avoid a potentially embarrassing loss? In 
short, the Office Depot example causes one to wonder how SOGP works 
and whether it matters. 
Large U.S. firms adopted golden parachutes in significant 
numbers beginning in the early 1980s, ostensibly as a way to lubricate 
the takeover market.33 An active takeover market allows acquirers to 
buy undervalued firms by sharing a portion of any potentially unlocked 
value with the selling shareholders via a deal premium.34 This process 
often involves replacing incumbent management, which gives those 
managers incentives to avoid the takeover.35 The threat of a takeover 
might lead incumbent managers to perform better in order to avoid 
 
 31. See Michael J. de la Merced & Rachel Abrams, Office Depot and Staples Call Off Merger 
After Judge Blocks It, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/ 
business/dealbook/staples-office-depot-merger.html [https://perma.cc/W6ZL-GUSZ] (“A federal 
judge . . . blocked a $6.3 billion proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot, dashing another huge 
deal and handing the Obama administration one more antitrust victory.”). 
 32. Office Depot, Inc., Annual Proxy Statement (Schedule 14a), 71 (May 4, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312518087753/d533814ddef14a.htm#rom
533814_ [https://perma.cc/UA5S-MTDD]. 
 33. See Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-
Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179, 183–85 (1985) (discussing the incentive 
alignment hypothesis of golden parachutes, which “assumes that the compensation 
provided . . . has a favorable influence on top management’s reaction to takeover bids”). 
 34. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1981) (“A cash tender offer typically 
presents shareholders of the ‘target’ corporation with the opportunity to sell many if not all of their 
shares quickly and at a premium over the market price.”); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach 
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 819 
(1981) (“[A]n offer provides shareholders with the opportunity to sell their shares for a substantial 
premium over market price.”); Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. 
POL. ECON. 110, 115–17 (1965) (describing the process of direct purchase of shares). Even when a 
company is not being mismanaged and/or undervalued, an acquirer may decide to purchase the 
company for other reasons, such as synergies. To the extent that the target management may be 
against such acquisitions, golden parachutes can still function as an inducement. 
 35. See, e.g., Lambert & Larcker, supra note 33, at 184: 
There are three aspects of the loss incurred by the managers of target firms. First, the 
manager does not receive wages until he finds new employment. Second, the manager 
may not be paid as much in his new job. This can arise if the manager possesses firm-
specific human capital or if the incentive plan of his former company was structured to 
pay him less than his marginal product in the early part of his career and more than 
his marginal product later in his career. When the executive is terminated, he loses the 
additional late period payout because his new company has no incentive to pay him 
more than his marginal product. Finally, the manager loses any non-pecuniary benefits 
of his position, including his power and prestige. 
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becoming a target in the first place.36 But other avoidance techniques 
are also available, with incumbent managers often in a position to resist 
takeovers by virtue of their control and their relationship with their 
board.37 
Firms adjusted their arrangements with executives, in part, to 
solve the problem of incumbent recalcitrance.38 Stock and option 
awards became common forms of compensation, and their values 
increased and often vested upon a takeover, providing incumbents with 
a possible windfall even if they might later be fired. Still, the pain of 
termination may not have been entirely eliminated for managers with 
significant firm-specific human capital investments or access to the 
private benefits of control. Golden parachutes helped to further 
encourage incumbent managers to accept takeover bids by promising 
them additional payments. Specifically, golden parachutes promise 
that, for a period of time following (and, in some cases, for a period of 
time prior to) a change in control, the acquiring company will pay target 
managers enhanced severance if terminated under certain 
circumstances.39 
Golden parachutes commonly define a “change in control” as a 
merger, the acquisition of some percentage of company shares, or the 
turnover of a majority of the incumbent board.40 In some cases, this 
 
 36. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The Case of 
Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 126 (1989) (“We assume that control 
mechanisms such as . . . hostile takeovers are only partially effective. It is in the interest of the 
manager to make them less effective. We show how manager-specific investments help the 
manager reduce the threat of replacement.”). 
 37. The most famous entrenchment device is the poison pill, which effectively prevents 
takeovers unless they are approved by the target’s board. See, e.g., id. The pill may be particularly 
effective when coupled with a staggered board, which prevents a hostile buyer from taking control 
of the board in two or more election cycles. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & 
Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and 
Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002). But more subtle subversion tools are available to target 
managers. See, e.g., Brian Broughman, CEO Side Payments in Mergers and Acquisitions, 2017 
BYU L. REV. 67, 90–91:  
Targets generally rely on their CEO to negotiate the merger agreement. This position 
gives the CEO considerable discretion to negotiate personal benefits into the agreement 
that is sent to the board. . . . [I]f the CEO leaves prior to closing or otherwise become 
uncooperative during negotiations, this could destroy a great deal of the firm’s value to 
the acquirer. The CEO’s holdup power makes it especially hard and costly for the board 
to replace her as primary negotiator on behalf of the firm. The CEO can use such holdup 
power to bargain for personal benefits. (footnotes omitted).  
 38. For more on these devices, see Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Golden Parachutes, 
Severance, and Firm Value, 68 FLA. L. REV. 875 (2017).  
 39. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design 
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 834 (2002) (discussing the use of golden 
parachutes to discourage CEOs blocking takeovers). Some single-trigger GPs do not require a 
subsequent termination. 
 40. Sales of substantially all assets of the company are usually covered as well. 
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“single trigger” activates payment obligations on the part of the firm 
even when the executives continue their employment with the 
combined entity. However, more often a number of subsequent 
termination scenarios serve as a “double trigger” that results in the 
golden parachute payment.41 Those scenarios usually involve a 
termination by the company without “cause” or a resignation by the 
CEO for “good reason.”42 The standard golden parachute consists of 
various components, including a cash payment articulated as a multiple 
of an executive’s salary and bonus. Often, executives are to receive 
continued perks for a period of time and perhaps enhanced 
contributions to retirement plans.43 The equity compensation plan 
under which stock awards have been made or the merger agreement 
will frequently call for automatic vesting of this equity upon the change 
in control, but if not, the golden parachute may require accelerated 
vesting. Finally, golden parachutes may call for gross-ups to make 
executives whole for excise taxes they may incur under Section 4999 of 
the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”).44 
It remains an open question whether golden parachutes increase 
or decrease shareholder wealth. They might increase shareholder 
wealth by encouraging more takeovers at premiums to current share 
prices. One of us has argued that golden parachutes can also allow the 
current shareholders to shift compensation costs onto future 
shareholders.45 Golden parachutes might also encourage managers to 
 
 41. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 259 (2006). 
 42. See generally id. at 253 (discussing “good reason” triggers, which include diminution in 
responsibilities, diminution in compensation, and forced relocation). 
 43. In our hand-collected sample, we find these “other” amounts at 76% of firms that make 
some sort of GP promise. 
 44. See I.R.C. § 4999 (2012) (imposing excise tax on recipient of excess parachute payment). 
That excise tax (along with a loss of deduction on the company side under Section 280G) came 
about when Congress first attempted to rein in GPs in 1984. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Section 4999 
imposes a 20% excise tax on executives receiving “excess” parachute payments, i.e., payments 
above three times the executive’s average compensation during the period prior to the deal. I.R.C. 
§ 4999. Until the adoption of Section 409A in 2004, which restricted payment of deferred 
compensation to executives, GPs were the only terms in an executive employment agreement 
subject to their own special tax penalty. See I.R.C. § 409A (2012) (amended 2018). The recently 
repealed § 162(m) of the I.R.C. also imposed tax consequences on high levels of pay that are not 
sufficiently “performance-based.” See Mullane, supra note 1 at 519–26; Gregg D. Polsky, 
Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 884 
(2007) (“Section 162(m) was intended both to reduce the overall level of executive compensation 
and to make such compensation more sensitive to firm performance.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation Shifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 170 (2004) (suggesting that because the incidence of GPs is partly born by the 
acquirer, GPs can permit target shareholders to shift some of their compensation burden onto 
acquirers). 
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pursue more valuable but risky projects and manage for the long term 
by reducing the penalties for short-term failure normally associated 
with takeovers.46 
On the other hand, recent academic criticisms of golden 
parachutes have focused on the potential for these contracts to actually 
exacerbate agency costs at public firms.47 Specifically, by making 
terminations less painful, golden parachutes might create effort 
disincentives for CEOs.48 Recent research suggested that golden 
parachute adoptions may be associated with subsequent declines in 
firm value.49 Even if they do not produce perverse incentives, golden 
parachutes may divert more of the deal premium away from 
shareholders than is strictly necessary to overcome executive 
resistance.50 To that extent, shareholders at the target firm may 
understandably believe that their payout in a takeover has been 
reduced because a larger golden parachute was awarded to their CEO. 
Even if they believe that some amount of compensation was necessary 
or appropriate to encourage the deal, higher-than-necessary golden 
parachutes might lead to shareholder dissatisfaction over the lost 
opportunity. In fact, some institutional shareholders have fought with 
portfolio firms over what they viewed as excessive golden parachutes, 
going so far as to threaten to vote against a proposed merger.51 
 
 46. See Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investments, 
and Innovation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 2027, 2032 (2015) (“With [golden parachutes], managers are 
assured of realizing the long-term value of their work even if the company is acquired, and as a 
result, they are more likely to specifically invest in the firm.”). 
 47. There are, of course, other criticisms of golden parachutes, mostly centered on concerns 
for distributive justice. See, e.g., Paul G. Wilhelm, Application of Distributive Justice Theory to the 
CEO Pay Problem: Recommendations for Reform, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 469, 472–73 (1993) (“[W]hy 
should golden parachutes be available only to a few top executives and not to the many other 
management team members?”). 
 48. Presumably, however, shareholders (represented by the compensation committee 
directors) can offset such a perverse incentive through an increase in the normal pay-for-
performance sensitivity, accomplished by, for instance, relying more on stock options, grants, or 
just plain old bonuses. 
 49. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles Wang, Golden Parachutes and the 
Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 140, 150–51 (2014) (discussing the ways that golden 
parachutes might decrease firm value by “contribut[ing] to managerial slack” and creating a 
“ ‘selling-out’ effect”). In another paper, two of us questioned recent empirical work suggesting that 
golden parachutes are associated with decreases in firm value. See Lund & Schonlau, supra note 
38, at 905 (observing that basic severance promises, rather than enhanced severance under golden 
parachutes, may be responsible for the correlations between golden parachutes and firm value 
declines observed by others). 
 50. See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 33, at 185 (“[T]he GP increases the cost 
of . . . conducting a takeover and dismissing management. That is, the GP contract requires the 
acquiring firm to retain and/or compensate executives that it might prefer to terminate. This 
reduces the takeover premium that the acquiring firm is willing to pay.”). 
 51. See Treasurer, CalPERS Seek to End “Golden Parachutes” from Mergers, CEDAR VALLEY 
BUS. MONTHLY (Aug. 14, 2004), https://wcfcourier.com/business/local/treasurer-calpers-seek-to-
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B. Advisory Votes and Executive Compensation  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, shareholders are not the only ones that 
have been dissatisfied with golden parachutes. Since they achieved 
critical mass within public companies in the 1980s, these contracts have 
also been a popular political target. Until the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act with its requirement of SOGP votes, the most concrete 
legislative attack on golden parachutes came in 1986 when Congress 
established the excise tax for “excess” ones with a corresponding loss of 
compensation deductions for the firm.52 To be an “excess” golden 
parachute, the total amount paid to the executive must exceed three 
times the executive’s “base amount,” understood to be the average of 
the five prior years’ taxable compensation.53 If that occurs, the paying 
firm cannot deduct the compensation for purposes of the corporate 
income tax and, more importantly for practical purposes, the recipient 
must pay a 20% excise tax on top of normal income taxes.54 Private 
companies may avoid these consequences by obtaining shareholder 
approval of the payments prior to the merger, but public companies may 
not avail themselves of this escape route.55 
More recently, Congress and the SEC have shifted gears in the 
fight against excessive golden parachutes and now rely more on 
shareholders to police these arrangements. First, the SEC adopted 
enhanced disclosure requirements surrounding compensation 
generally—and golden parachutes specifically—so that shareholders 
might better understand the promises being made to executives.56 To 
channel any resulting outrage, the Dodd-Frank Act included two 
advisory votes. 
First came a requirement that public companies submit the 
entirety of their “top five” compensation arrangements to a shareholder 
 
end-golden-parachutes-from-mergers/article_6db197d2-27e6-5753-8873-06ddc53ac734.html 
[https://perma.cc/F48Z-3M28] (stating that the board of the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System plans to vote against a prospective merger to fight against costly corporate 
executive severance packages). 
 52. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 53. I.R.C. § 280G (2012). 
 54. Id.; I.R.C. § 4999 (2012). As discussed above, the target company can promise to 
neutralize the effect of this additional excise tax on the recipients by further “grossing up” the total 
severance payments. 
 55. I.R.C. § 280G. 
 56. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012). Item 5 of 
Schedule 14A mandated disclosure of “any substantial interest, direct or indirect, by security 
holdings or otherwise, of any person who has been an executive officer or director since the 
beginning of the last fiscal year in any matter to be acted upon,” so many firms already disclosed 
such information. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute 
Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249). 
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SOP vote.57 The SOP provision in Dodd-Frank introduced in 2009 
mirrored a provision introduced by Representative Frank two years 
earlier before the financial crisis exploded. SOP followed similar 
regimes adopted in the UK and a number of other jurisdictions since 
2000.58 It covers all pay received by top executives, including golden 
parachutes.59 Unlike the revised UK version in place since 2013, the 
vote is not binding on firms.60 
Second, the Dodd-Frank Act required public companies to 
submit golden parachutes to an SOGP advisory shareholder vote to be 
held simultaneously with any shareholder vote on a change in control.61 
Thus, golden parachutes are the only term in CEO compensation 
contracts that are subject to their own discrete shareholder votes. 
Unlike SOP, SOGP was not in the Senate version of Dodd-Frank until 
the very end of the legislative process, when the House version 
including the provision was adopted in conference without any notable 
public discussion or congressional debate. The vote is advisory and may 
be avoided entirely if the golden parachute was disclosed in conjunction 
with an earlier SOP vote.62 However, few firms avail themselves of this 
 
 57. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78n-1(a)(1) (2012). Section 951 of Dodd-Frank also requires firms to submit to a non-binding 
shareholder vote on the frequency of the SOP vote, i.e., every one, two, or three years, with that 
vote occurring no less frequently than once every six years. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(2). SOP subjects 
the compensation of the executives named in the firm’s proxy statement to a shareholder vote. 
 58. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on the 
Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (noting SOP’s 
adoption in Sweden); Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law 
and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 226–36 (2008) (describing SOP’s adoption in the 
United Kingdom and Australia); Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around 
the World, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 653 (2015) (analyzing SOP legislation across the globe).   
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a) (requiring approval of all compensation disclosed pursuant to 
Item 40 of Regulation S-K). As we will discuss later, the fact that the golden parachutes are also 
subject to annual SOP votes could imply that, before the change-in-control actually takes place, 
the company may be more hesitant in increasing (or promising very generous) golden parachutes 
and is more likely to increase the payment immediately before the change-in-control takes place. 
 60. The advisory nature of the votes was even highlighted in the final version of the Dodd-
Frank Act, which specified that any action or inaction by the board in response to the votes was 
not grounds for a fiduciary-duty violation under state corporate law. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)(1)–
(3); Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 
Fed. Reg. 6010, 6011 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249) (“These shareholder 
votes also do not ‘create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of 
directors’ nor do they ‘create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of 
directors.’ ” (footnotes omitted)). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(b)(2). 
 62. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1). To qualify as having been subject to a prior Say-on-Pay vote 
(and thus exempt from the specific GP advisory vote requirement at a later date), firms must 
disclose information required by Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K. For annual report purposes, on the 
other hand, they need only provide information under Item 402(j). The two disclosures are similar, 
thus one might have expected firms to disclose under 402(t) to receive the waiver from future Say-
on-GP votes.   
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preclearance option.63 It seems likely that firms view the downside of 
waiting for an SOGP vote at the time of a deal as being relatively small 
since the advisory nature of the vote and the final-period nature of most 
GP-triggering transactions mean their directors are unlikely to face any 
consequences. 
In both cases, the legislative history is not clear on Congress’s 
substantive goals regarding compensation levels or features. As a 
witness before the House considering the provisions, Gene Sperling, 
Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury, testified: “[W]e were not 
coming with a particular legislative or even regulatory proposal. We 
really were in a sense trying to shine a spotlight on a practice that we 
think . . . that shareholders and management should reexamine.”64 
Representative Frank himself observed, “It’s a question of empowering 
the shareholders to decide the appropriate level because it’s their 
money and giving regulators the ability to prevent compensation 
incentives that encourage taking inappropriate and excessive risk.”65 
Whether SOP or SOGP are deemed effective on their own terms, 
therefore, appears to hinge on firms’ sensitivity to shareholder voice as 
much as on reductions in overall GP promises or adjustment of 
particular terms. We examine each of these in Part II. 
1. The Advisory Vote Experience with Say on Pay 
SOP and SOGP are not the first examples of direct shareholder 
votes on executive compensation matters. For example, under stock 
exchange rules, shareholders are required to pass equity compensation 
 
 63. See, e.g., Michael G. O’Bryan, David M. Lynn & Scott G. Hodgdon, New Golden Parachute 
Compensation Disclosure and Shareholder Advisory Vote Requirements, MORRISON FORESTER 2 
(June 3, 2011), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/110603-SEC-Golden-Parachute-
Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/ULY3-35NV]: 
Based on the filings thus far this proxy season, it is unlikely that companies will often 
use the Say-on-Pay vote exception. In the months since the requirement for a 
mandatory Say-on-Pay vote became effective, only a handful of issuers have voluntarily 
included the Item 402(t) golden parachute compensation disclosures in their annual 
meeting proxy statements. Companies may be concerned with how these disclosures 
could impact the required Say-on-Pay vote, including whether such disclosures would 
be viewed favorably by proxy advisory services if the annual meeting proxies include 
the additional golden parachute compensation disclosures. In addition, companies may 
be concerned that providing such disclosures voluntarily signals the market that the 
company could be engaged in a significant transaction in the coming months.  
(footnote omitted). 
 64. Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
111th Cong. 27 (2009) (statement of Gene Sperling, Counselor to the Secretary of the Treasury, 
U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
 65. Press Release, Barney Frank, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Fin. Servs. (July 16, 
2009), https://democrats-financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID= 
382736 [https://perma.cc/V3ZY-X9KU]. 
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plans pursuant to which firms distribute restricted stock and options.66 
As discussed above, shareholder votes are able to cleanse “excess” 
golden parachutes from being subject to tax penalties, at least in the 
private company context.67 Recently repealed tax rules encouraged 
firms to have shareholders approve bonus plans in order to qualify them 
as deductible “performance-based” compensation.68 And, indirectly, 
annual director elections have at times become referenda on executive 
compensation matters. 
Expanding these voting rights to include advisory SOP and 
SOGP votes was attacked, on the one hand, as being weak medicine for 
whatever ailed executive compensation. The earlier voting rights that 
shareholders held had direct and certain consequences in the event of a 
negative vote. If an equity plan, for instance, was voted down, then it 
could not be used by exchange-listed companies to award options or 
restricted stock. If a bonus plan was voted down, compensation paid 
under it could not receive IRC 162(m)’s favorable “performance-based” 
designation for tax purposes.69 And, of course, directors being voted out 
via proxy contest would be an incredibly significant event. Because SOP 
and SOGP were nonbinding, critics denounced them as little more than 
a routinized set of votes on precatory proposals related to executive 
compensation under the “town hall meeting” rule in the federal proxy 
rules.70 
On the other hand, some commentators worried that SOP and 
SOGP, although advisory, represented an improper and potentially 
consequential incursion by shareholders into the traditional 
 
 66. See, e.g., Christopher S. Armstrong, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, The Efficacy of 
Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 909, 910 (2013); 
Andrew C.W. Lund, What Was the Question? The NYSE and Nasdaq’s Curious Listing Standards 
Requiring Shareholder Approval of Equity-Compensation Plans, 39 CONN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2006) 
(discussing shareholder roles in determining compensation levels of executives at public 
companies).  
 67. See supra note 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the Internal 
Revenue Code on GP payments). 
 68. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2012) (outlining deduction protocol for excessive employee 
remuneration). 
 69. When the bonus or option plan is no longer considered “performance based,” for any such 
compensation over $1 million per year, the company may no longer be able to treat them as an 
expense so as to reduce the corporate-income tax burden. See id. This preference for performance-
based compensation was eliminated in the recent tax bill revising the Internal Revenue Code. 
Regina Olshan et al., Section 162(m) After the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: What to Do Now, SKADDEN, 
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/01/section-162m-after-the-tax-cuts-and-
jobs-act [https://perma.cc/3DFV-MSEU]. 
 70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2019). For more on shareholder proposals, see Jie Cai & Ralph 
Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay: Does it Create Value?, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
299 (2011); and Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen Stubben, Board of Directors’ 
Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53 (2010). 
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decisionmaking domain of directors. At best, SOP and SOGP would add 
needless costs to the proxy process.71 Worse, boards might be directly or 
indirectly influenced by shareholders who misunderstood the impact of 
pay in setting executive incentives and attracting highly qualified 
managers.72 Worst, proxy advisors—chiefly ISS—might come to 
dominate shareholder votes and apply pernicious or unintelligible 
standards to public company pay, including golden parachutes.73 
Unsurprisingly given the heat of this debate, SOP has been the 
subject of a fair amount of study by academics in law and finance as 
well as advisory groups.74 Early studies of SOP voting found over 90% 
“yes” votes overall.75 Over time, that support has continued. Only 1.4%–
2.8% of pay plans were voted down in any given year between 2011 and 
2016.76 Depending on the threshold one adopts, substantial shareholder 
opposition has occurred with respect to either 7.4%–8.8% of votes (30% 
disapproval) or 23.5%–28.4% of votes (10% disapproval), neither of 
which suggests large-scale shareholder dissatisfaction over pay 
practices.77 
 
 71. See Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: H.R. 1257, The Shareholder 
Vote on Executive Compensation Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 
App. at 120–47 (March 8, 2007) (prepared statement of Stephen N. Kaplan, Neubauer Family 
Professor of Entrepeneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business) 
(attesting to the unnecessary costs imposed by say-on-pay voting). Some suggested more 
attenuated negative effects. See Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive 
Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 417 (2011) (observing that positive SOP results may enable 
boards to deflect blame for compensation decisions). 
 72. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance 
Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1815 (2011) (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s executive compensation 
provisions are inconsistent with the board-centric model of corporate governance); Thomas et al., 
supra note 7, at 1215 (asking “whether the . . . say-on-pay regime will change executive pay level 
and practices, and more generally, the dialogue between management and shareholders on the 
subject”). 
 73. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank, 2 
ENGAGE J. 33, 33–34, (2010); Bainbridge, supra note 72; Gordon, supra note 5, at 326; A Call for 
Change in the Proxy Advisory Industry Status Quo: The Case for Greater Accountability and 
Oversight, CTR. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7–8 (Jan. 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5U8W-H4VY]. 
 74. See, e.g., James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of Say-
on-Pay under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967 
(2013). 
 75. Id. at 979–80 (finding that pay plans in the next year following SOP adoption experienced 
91.2% support overall and that only 1.3% of firms experienced greater than 50% dissent). 
 76. See 2016 Say on Pay Results: End of Year Report, SEMLER BROSSY 1 (Feb. 1, 2017), 
http://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2016-Year-End-Say-on-Pay-Report-02-
01-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/69WD-SHLU].  
 77. Id. 
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These studies have also tended to show that ISS has not applied 
a routinized, one-size-fits-all approach to SOP recommendations.78 
Moreover, it appears that shareholders do not blindly follow ISS 
recommendations when voting on SOP. The earliest studies found that 
shareholders appeared to adjust ISS voting recommendations 
downward (more dissent) in cases of poor firm performance and upward 
(less dissent) in cases of excellent firm performance.79 Recent work 
confirms that, while proxy advisor recommendations play an important 
role, shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders, appear to 
base their voting decisions on many other factors, such as whether the 
firm has produced a good return in the recent past (as measured by 
either return on assets or abnormal return) and whether the total 
executive pay seems very large (as measured by whether the total pay 
is in the highest quartile among all publicly traded companies).80 
Finally, contrary to predictions of SOP’s inconsequentiality, 
studies have found that, on average, firms actively respond to negative 
SOP recommendations and votes.81 Ertimur et al. (2013), for instance, 
found that firms experiencing a negative recommendation or 
substantial (but not majority) shareholder opposition reported changes 
to pay practices in the subsequent year.82 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
firms must disclose how they have responded to the previous year’s SOP 
results in their subsequent proxies.83 Ertimur et al. (2013) showed that 
when 30% or more of the shares vote against the compensation, more 
than 70% of the firms respond by changing their pay practices in the 
 
 78. See Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 953 (“Contrary to critics’ concerns . . . we find limited 
evidence of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. That is, in most cases, the presence of certain provisions 
in the compensation plan does not automatically translate into negative recommendations.”). 
 79. See Cotter et al., supra note 74, at 986 (analyzing how total stock returns and ISS 
recommendations correlate with shareholder votes); see also Ryan Krause, Kimberley A. Witler & 
Matthew Semadeni, Power to the Principals! An Experimental Look at Shareholder Say-on-Pay 
Voting, 57 ACAD. MGMT. J. 94 (2014) (discussing how shareholders care about firm performance 
when exercising their SOP votes). Shareholders appeared to be better able to buck ISS “for” 
recommendations in the face of countervailing information (regarding recent increases in CEO pay 
or “excess” pay) than they were ISS “against” recommendations. That is, ISS “against” 
recommendations seemed dispositive in ways that ISS “for” recommendations were not. Id. at 989. 
 80. Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch show, for instance, the better the company’s financial return 
and the lower the CEO’s total pay, the less likely shareholders will vote against the executive pay. 
Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 954. Fisch, Palia, and Solomon, using a more updated dataset, also 
corroborate these findings. Fisch et al., supra note 5, at 121–23. Similar to Ertimur et al., Fisch et 
al. show that the negative SOP votes are correlated with lower stock returns and lower return on 
assets. Id. They also show a strong correlation between excess CEO pay (in terms of quartiles) and 
firm returns (in terms of quartiles). Id. Most of these correlations survive the inclusion of a control 
for ISS Against. See id. at 119–23 (finding that say on pay may actually be a say on performance). 
 81. See Cotter et al., supra note 74, at 1002–10 (presenting four case studies in which 
company management actively responded to negative ISS reports). 
 82. Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 986. 
 83. See discussion supra note 11. 
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subsequent year.84 Elsewhere, researchers found that boards reduced 
CEO compensation in response to negative SOP votes.85 Interestingly, 
other researchers found an ex ante effect of SOP, whereby boards 
reduced CEO compensation and made it more performance based in 
advance of SOP votes.86 Although other studies found SOP to be less 
effective in shaping contracting practices,87 these findings suggest that 
SOP, despite being advisory, may be able to influence incumbent boards 
to make corporate governance changes under certain circumstances. 
2. Advisory Votes on Golden Parachutes 
Like SOP, SOGP provides for an advisory vote on executive 
compensation and was adopted at the same time as SOP. These 
similarities raise the question of whether what we are learning about 
SOP can map onto the experience with SOGP. To this point, the only 
research done on the SOGP process has been summary work by 
advisory firms. From this work, we know that the results of SOGP votes 
have generally been favorable. According to a Pearl Meyer white paper, 
of the 699 GP votes held from implementation in 2011 through 2016, 
70% resulted in high shareholder approval (80% approval or greater) 
while majority negative votes were obtained in only 5% of cases.88 
At the same time, a superficial look suggests that ISS is 
becoming aggressive in its recommendations against GPs.89 ISS and 
 
 84. Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 985 fig.1. 
 85. Marinilka B. Kimbro & Danielle Xu, Shareholders Have a Say in Executive 
Compensation: Evidence from Say-on-Pay in the United States, 35 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 36 
(2016) (“[E]ven when [the return on assets] increases, there is a reduction in excessive 
compensation in firms with high SOP dissent.”).  
 86. See Steven Balsam, Jeff Boone, Harrison Liu & Jennifer Yin, The Impact of Say-on-Pay 
on Executive Compensation, 35 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 162, 188 (2016) (“[F]irms modified their 
compensation packages with an eye toward winning shareholder approval of their executive 
compensation” ahead of SOP’s adoption). 
 87. See Kelly R. Brunarski, T. Colin Campbell & Yvette S. Harman, Evidence on the Outcome 
of Say-On-Pay Votes: How Managers, Directors, and Shareholders Respond, 30 J. CORP. FIN. 132, 
147 (2015) (“SOP legislation has not had the intended effect of improving CEO contracting, at least 
in the short term.”). 
 88. Margaret Black & Daniel Wetzel, Updated: Say on Golden Parachute Votes, PEARL MEYER 
2 (June 20, 2016), https://www.pearlmeyer.com/say-golden-parachute.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ6Q-
3RW9]. 
 89. Margaret Black & Daniel Wetzel, Updated: Say on Golden Parachute Votes, PEARL MEYER 
3 (Dec. 17, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/20140429050745/http://www.pearlmeyer.com/Pearl/ 
media/PearlMeyer/ArticlesWhitepapers/PMP-ART-SOGPUpdate-12-17-2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K7QC-KPTK]: 
These recent changes in its voting guidelines appear to be increasing the likelihood that 
ISS will issue a negative voting recommendation on transaction pay proposals. In fact, 
ISS seems to be doing so roughly twice as often as for Say on Pay proposals. Negative 
voting recommendations were made for 35 of the 125 SOGP proposals (approximately 
28%) brought before shareholders in meetings between February 1, 2013 and October 
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other proxy advisory firms have maintained guidelines relating to GPs 
for some time, even predating the SOGP regime.90 ISS’s 2016 Proxy 
Voting Guidelines, which remain practically unchanged, recommend 
voting “case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals” and 
“consider[ing] . . . existing change-in-control arrangements maintained 
with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or 
extended arrangements.”91 ISS further calls out problematic features 
that may lead to a negative recommendation without spelling out 
precisely how the decision will be made: 
Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance; [s]ingle-trigger acceleration of unvested 
equity awards; [e]xcessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus); [e]xcise tax gross-
ups triggered and payable (as opposed to a provision to provide excise tax gross-ups); 
[e]xcessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of 
transaction equity value); or [r]ecent amendments that incorporate any problematic 
features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that 
may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in 
the best interests of shareholders . . . .92 
The ISS guidelines conclude by noting that “[r]ecent 
amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry 
more weight on the overall analysis.”93 Other shareholder advisors and 
institutional shareholders have begun to adopt similar guidelines. 
Glass Lewis, ISS’s most significant competitor, has adopted guidelines 
that are more opaque.94 Vanguard, similar to other institutional 
 
31, 2013. In contrast, 20% of proposals received “Against” recommendations in voting 
results filed through December 31, 2012, as reported in our March 2013 update.   
 90. This makes sense given the common belief that GPs were the subject of a large number 
of shareholder proposals in earlier periods. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 39, at 140. In fact, 
Georgeson Annual Corporate Governance reports categorized shareholder proposals relating to all 
forms of severance as “Golden Parachute” proposals, artificially inflating the perceived levels of 
shareholder dissatisfaction with GPs in particular. See, e.g., 2008 Annual Corporate Governance 
Review, GEORGESON 32 (2008), https://www.georgeson.com/us/Documents/acgr/acgr2008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4YN-JGLH] (describing Boeing shareholder proposal as one to approve/vote on 
future GPs); see also The Boeing Company, Proxy Statement (Schedule 14a), Item 9 (Mar. 14, 
2008), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/12927/000119312508057498/ddef14a.htm# 
toc96257_38 [https://perma.cc/J7NG-L4PM] (describing Boeing shareholder proposal to require 
shareholder approval of certain future severance agreements). 
 91. United States Summary Proxy Voting Guidelines: 2016 Benchmark Policy 
Recommendations, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. 42 (2016), https://www.issgovernance.com/ 
file/policy/2016-us-summary-voting-guidelines-23-feb-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9C4-NB7F]. 
ISS explicitly called out such features beginning in 2013 about a year and a half after SOGP votes 
were actually underway. 
 92. Id. at 42. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice: United States, 
GLASS LEWIS 33 (2019), https://www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ 
Guidelines_US.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MG7-SN3M] (stating that “[e]gregious or 
excessive . . . severance payments, including . . . golden parachutes” is a factor that militates in 
favor of a negative recommendation on an SOP vote). 
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investors, has explicitly accepted that GPs may be appropriate in most 
contexts, subject to restraints on specific features.95 
Yet, to our knowledge, no one has attempted a full treatment of 
SOGP. Partially, the failure to study SOGP may stem from an 
assumption that SOGP plays a negligible role, if any, in compensation 
or deal planning. On the other hand, it may partly stem from a lack of 
available data. Information about proxy advisor recommendations and 
shareholder votes is available, as is information about projected GP 
payout amounts that is required to be disclosed each year by public 
companies.96 But there is no database that aggregates final GP 
promises as disclosed in the merger proxy leading to the SOGP vote, 
which is ultimately the information on which proxy advisors and 
shareholders are basing their decisions and which may deviate 
substantially from the previously disclosed GP projections due to 
contract amendments, increases in equity values, or salary and bonus 
increases, among other things. Our hand collection of golden parachute 
data from merger proxies solves this problem. 
How similar to SOP is SOGP in theory? Despite their obvious 
similarities, there is reason to think the two voting regimes are apt to 
have different results. Under SOP, directors who fail to react to proxy 
advisors or shareholder pressure face plausible consequences, up to and 
including shareholder backlash in the next director election. SOGP, on 
the other hand, takes place only in the context of takeovers where the 
directors experiencing dissent are unlikely to be standing for reelection 
in the coming years, and, even if they are continuing as directors in the 
new entity, they will be subject to votes from a much different 
shareholder group in ensuing years. As such, they are subject only to 
reputation costs in the director labor market, which may not be strong 
enough to compel action. 
Furthermore, SOP puts bargaining pressure on executives. 
Sometimes, executives may be willing to amend their existing 
compensation arrangements in order to placate shareholders because 
they anticipate future interactions as they continue as executives. 
Other times, the directors are unilaterally choosing to grant equity 
awards, pay bonuses, or raise salaries. In either case, executives are not 
in a particularly strong position to force pay decisions that might 
 
 95. Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Portfolio Companies, VANGUARD FUNDS 13 (2019), 
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-company-
resources/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQR-729R] (“A fund will vote for 
proposals to approve golden parachutes unless they are excessive or unreasonable (e.g., severance 
payments total more than three times salary plus bonus, are ‘single trigger,’ or include excise tax 
gross-ups.”)). 
 96. See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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antagonize shareholders. CEOs holding golden parachutes are in 
another situation entirely. They are likely to be terminating their 
relationship with the firm as part of the merger and may therefore be 
less willing to renegotiate existing golden parachutes to appease proxy 
advisors or shareholders. 
This leaves open the possibility that initial golden parachute 
terms might be negotiated in the shadow of future SOGP votes. On the 
other hand, a golden parachute promise with no takeover in the offing 
may not prove salient enough to shareholders to generate enough 
outrage. In any event, a golden parachute promise with no takeover in 
the offing that does generate shareholder outrage is necessarily going 
to be subject to shareholder dissent via the annual SOP vote rather than 
an SOGP vote that does not need to be held until a takeover occurs. 
Thus, SOGP may be less effective than other corporate governance tools 
(including SOP specifically) in shaping compensation decisions. 
II. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
In this Part, we empirically examine the experience with SOGP 
since its adoption under the Dodd-Frank Act. The most pertinent 
questions are whether the SOGP regime has had an effect on proxy 
advisors’ recommendations and shareholders’ voting behavior, and 
whether SOGP has had an overall effect on golden parachute 
contracting. If SOGP had, or was perceived to have had, no disciplinary 
effect, we would expect a number of things. First, golden parachute 
incidence and dollar values would have been unaffected by SOGP’s 
adoption. Target firms would not adjust golden parachutes downward 
in the face of actual or potential negative SOGP recommendations or 
votes. We would also expect to see certain phenomena with respect to 
the voting process itself. Proxy advisors might economize by using 
simple, one-size-fits-all criteria when making their recommendations if 
their clients were expected to care less about the vote. Further, SOGP 
voters might simply adopt whatever proxy advisor recommendations 
they receive if it is obvious to them that it is not wise to expend their 
own resources to sort through the merits of the decision. 
A. Data Collection and Sample Description 
Our empirical study utilizes four different data sources: (1) ISS 
voting data which show the results of SOGP votes; (2) CRSP-Compustat 
data that include various company financial and nonfinancial 
characteristics, such as Book Value of Assets, Return on Assets 
(“ROA”), and Market Value of Equity (“MVE”); (3) the Execucomp 
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dataset, from which we get information on executives that receive 
golden parachute payments, including CEO salary, bonus, and 
projected golden parachute payments (the summed amount including 
unobservable amounts of potential cash payments and accelerated 
equity vesting); and (4) a novel, hand-collected dataset (pulled from the 
companies’ merger proxies and S-4 registration statements) on final 
golden parachute payments that have been subjected to SOGP votes. 
We discuss this in more detail below. 
First, we use the ISS Company Vote Results database to find all 
SOGP votes at Russell 3000 firms from 2011 to 2017 related to GPs and 
find 803 observations. We then merge those firms with the CRSP-
Compustat sample for annual financial data by fiscal year and firm-
identifying information, yielding 647 observations through June 2017. 
After removing cases triggering an SOGP vote but not actually 
involving a golden parachute (usually instances of an excise tax 
reimbursement pursuant to Section 4985 of the IRC), we have 631 
observations. We call this the “Russell 3000 Sample.” Consistent with 
earlier empirical studies on SOP, we merge these firms with Execucomp 
for compensation information as well as insider characteristics such as 
CEO age, tenure, and ownership. Execucomp does not track many of 
the firms in the ISS SOGP vote database, leaving us with 263 firms 
with complete information. We call this subset of the Russell 3000 
Sample the “Execucomp Sample.” 
In addition, instead of relying solely on commercially available 
data, we have also hand collected and coded each proxy statement 
preceding an SOGP vote for firms in the Russell 3000 Sample. Those 
proxies come in the form of either a definitive merger proxy or an S-4 
filed by an acquiring company in a stock-for-stock deal. Both of these 
documents require information described in Item 502(t) of Regulation 
S-K, which calls for tabular disclosure of potential GP payments broken 
out into categories: cash, equity, and perquisites/other. We collected 
data regarding the final potential GP payments disclosed in the proxy, 
breaking amounts into cash (salary and bonus), equity, perquisites 
(“other” excluding tax gross-ups and pension plan accelerations), and 
the total (all amounts including tax gross-ups and pension plan 
accelerations). Firms are not required to disclose bona fide post-
transaction employment agreements between (1) named executive 
officers of the target and (2) the acquirer.97 This potentially subjects our 
hand coding to a serious undercounting problem to the extent acquirers 
transform current GPs into post-transaction employment contracts 
 
 97. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 
76 Fed. Reg. 6010, 6027 (Feb. 2, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249). 
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with severance protections. In fact, however, targets very often describe 
such arrangements either directly (in which case we include such 
potential payments in our GP data) or with a statement that no such 
arrangements have been entered into between the parties.98  
This provides two advantages. First, our data are able to break 
down the components of golden parachutes rather than simply 
observing the total as Execucomp does. This is important to the extent 
that certain features of golden parachutes are handled differently by 
proxy advisors or shareholders than others. Second, we observe closer-
to-actualized golden parachute obligations than those disclosed in 
earlier annual proxy statements. The amounts we find via hand coding 
remain hypothetical to the extent they are double triggers and rely on 
a future termination. But the commercially available data commonly 
used in academic studies provides a snapshot of golden parachutes from 
a much earlier date, which necessarily cannot account for late 
amendments or increases in golden parachutes’ equity value brought on 
by any deal premium. Most obviously, it is these data and not ones from 
earlier periods that proxy advisors and shareholders are examining 
when they are making their SOGP decisions. 
 






















2006 1,895 1,084 11,503.27    4,576.26  13.08 7.58 
2007 2,237 1,680  11,167.63    4,744.50  13.08 8.22 
2008 2,160 1,660   8,907.90    4,270.73  10.14 6.80 
2009 2,122 1,687  10,721.46    5,472.06  12.53 8.78 
2010 2,095 1,712  12,791.29    6,690.08  14.49 10.30 
2011 2,057 1,660  11,834.42    6,373.80  13.25 9.49 
2012 2,019 1,608  12,496.98    6,827.52  13.66 9.64 
2013 1,978 1,587  14,858.91    8,186.56  15.73 11.44 
2014 1,941 1,598  15,881.52    8,976.26  16.56 12.26 
2015 1,858 1,513  14,290.72    8,347.68  14.57 10.92 
2016 1,753 1,442  15,780.63   10,081.44  16.30 12.86 
2017 76 67  16,139.96   11,435.87  17.27 15.08 
 
We begin by observing golden parachute incidence and dollar 
values during the period preceding SOGP’s adoption through the 
 
 98. This transparency is somewhat puzzling but may be explained by the requirement in 
Items 5(a) and 5(b)(xii) of Schedule 14A to disclose such agreements if they constitute a 
“substantial interest” in the business combination. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2019). 
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present across all Execucomp firms whether or not they experience a 
change-in-control event. Table 1 presents this data in an easy-to-read 
format. Firms with golden parachutes ranged from 75.1% (2007) to 
82.3% (2014 and 2016). Only 57.2% of firms reported golden parachutes 
in 2006, though that number is so far from subsequent years, we believe 
it likely represents an error in reporting either by firms or Execucomp 
in the first year following the adoption of new compensation disclosure 
rules. These data show that firms adopted golden parachutes regardless 
of whether a change-in-control event was apt to occur as part of a 
standard CEO employment agreement. Average and median golden 
parachutes were generally increasing throughout the period. The 
average golden parachute was over $11 million in 2007, dipped to under 
$9 million in 2008,99 and steadily rose to over $15 million. Median 
amounts reflected a similar trajectory. We return to this data below to 
examine the effect of SOGP’s introduction in 2011. 
 
TABLE 2: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOGP FIRMS 
 
  Mean Median Observations 
Book assets (millions) 4,349.49 1,137.30  631 
ln(MVE) (millions) 6.41 6.33  631 
ROA 0.06 0.08  631 
Abnormal Returns 0.00 -0.02  631 
Insider Holdings 5.36 1.11  631 
Institutional Holdings 69.13 78.27  631 
Deal Premium 1.28 1.20  631 
CEO Total Compensation (millions) 7.16 4.64  263 
CEO Golden Parachute (GP) (millions) 16.44 11.53  263 
CEO Salary + Bonus (millions) 1.04 0.90  263 
Ratio of CEO GP to Salary 16.99 13.29  262 
CEO Tenure 8.48 7.00  263 
All CEO Total Compensation (millions) 5.34 2.08  48,240  
All CEO Golden Parachute (GP) (millions) 12.67 6.59  21,895  
 
When we narrow our focus to firms experiencing an SOGP vote 
(as shown in Table 2 except for the final two rows), we see that the 
median annual compensation in the year of a golden parachute event 
for CEOs from the Execucomp Sample was $4.64 million ($7.16 million 
 
 99. We suspect this dip is driven by the drop in GP equity value during the financial crisis. 
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average) as compared with $2.08 million ($5.34 million average) in the 
Execucomp database more generally.100 The median preexisting GP 
obligation to a CEO experiencing a golden parachute event was $11.53 
million ($16.44 million average) compared to $6.59 million ($12.67 
million average) in the overall Execucomp database. This results in an 
average golden-parachute-to-compensation ratio of 2.48 for the fiscal 
year prior to an SOGP vote.101 With our hand-coded data we are able to 
compare predicted golden parachutes from the prior fiscal year to final 
golden parachutes at the time of the deal. We find a median Final GP 
of $13.11 million ($19.22 million average), or a 13.7% (16.9%) increase 
between the prior fiscal year and the period immediately preceding the 
SOGP vote. Execucomp does not separate the components of a golden 
parachute in its data, so we are unable to determine which parts of 
golden parachutes might be driving this last-period increase. It is likely 
the case that the value of golden parachute equity increased during that 
period, assuming the amount of unvested equity stayed relatively 
constant (i.e., the executive did not cash out more than he received), as 
the takeover will usually occasion a jump in equity value. It may also 
be the case that executives were able to negotiate for extra 
compensation during this period,102 a potentiality that we address in 
Table 7 below. 
B. Proxy Advisors 
Our first empirical examination attempts to answer whether 
and how recommendations issued by ISS, by far the most important 
proxy advisory firm,103 correlate with various characteristics of golden 
parachutes, executives, firms, and the takeover deal. Tables 3 and 4 
tabulate information regarding the SOGP votes in our Russell 3000 
Sample by year.  
 
 
 100. We look to the fiscal year of the shareholder vote on SOGP and match that with the fiscal 
year compensation information in the Execucomp database. When Execucomp drops the firm in 
that fiscal year because of the takeover, we use the prior fiscal year’s compensation information 
from Execucomp. 
 101. Note that this number is substantially below the GP/Salary ratios shown in Table 1. This 
is primarily because the denominator in the implied ratio from Table 2 is total annual 
compensation as opposed to salary only in Table 1. 
 102. See Broughman, supra note 37, at 90–91 (discussing the possibility that CEOs “can 
use . . . holdup power to bargain for personal benefits”).  
 103. See Choi et al., supra note 9, for a more detailed discussion on proxy advisory firms and 
the perceived influence of ISS. 
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Average % of 
Shares 
Outstanding 
Voted For  
Average % of 
Shares 
Outstanding 




2011 37 0.62 0.09 32 4 
2012 81 0.57 0.13 64 17 
2013 120 0.59 0.13 84 35 
2014 99 0.61 0.12 71 26 
2015 123 0.59 0.15 88 32 
2016 135 0.63 0.13 100 35 
2017 36 0.60 0.17 21 15 
           
From Table 3, we see an overall recommendation rate of 72.9% 
by ISS for SOGP proposals. The table shows variation in ISS 
recommendations across time. There is a noticeably small rate of 
negative recommendations in 2011 and a noticeably large rate of 
negative recommendations in the first part of 2017. Although the 
reasons behind this difference require more detailed empirical analysis, 
we suspect that it stems from the general downturn or up-turn in the 
stock market, which, in turn, affects the size of the golden parachute, 
especially through the stock- and option-vesting provisions. 
Table 4 shows that although the ISS recommendations on golden 
parachutes are correlated with the recommendations on the mergers, 
there is some divergence. Foremost, out of 626 mergers that were 
subject to shareholder approval, ISS recommended “for” the merger in 
611 cases: the rate of recommendation in favor of the merger is about 
97.6%, which raises the specter that ISS is more or less “rubber-
stamping” the merger proposals. At the same time, however, out of the 
626 golden parachute proposals, ISS was recommending “against” in 
159 cases, which is a negative recommendation rate of about 25.4%. 
Unlike its recommendations on mergers, there seems to be a 
significantly higher variation with respect to ISS’s recommendations on 
golden parachutes. If we were to take a closer look at split-
recommendation cases, out of 611 cases where ISS recommended “for” 
votes on mergers, in 159 cases (about 26%), ISS’s recommendation on 
SOGP was “against.” Somewhat interestingly, out of the eleven cases 
where ISS recommended against the merger, in seven cases, they also 
recommended that the shareholders approve the golden parachute 
payments. The number of observations in Table 4 is reduced by 5 
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because in those cases we were unable to find ISS’s recommendation on 
the merger. 
 
TABLE 4: CORRELATION IN PROXY ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
    ISS SOGP Recommendation   
    Against Do Not Vote For Total 
ISS Merger 
Recommendation  
Against 3 1 7 11 
Do Not Vote 0 2 2 4 
For 159 4 448 611 
  Total 162 7 457 626 
 
Consistent with the findings of Ertimur et al. (2013) with respect 
to SOP, we expect to find a positive relationship between ISS “against” 
SOGP recommendations and both high golden parachute amounts as 
well as poor firm performance.104 To get a better understanding of how 
ISS’s recommendations are related to various measures, we estimate a 
logistic regression where the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if ISS recommends “against.” ISS specifically calls 
out problematic GP features that may lead to a negative 
recommendation: (1) single-trigger payouts or equity vesting even if the 
executive is not fired; (2) tax gross-ups; (3) high levels of cash severance 
relative to previous salary and bonus; and (4) “excessive” parachutes 
generally.105 ISS also notes that recent amendments may be weighted 
more heavily. The single- or double-trigger nature of golden parachutes 
is difficult to capture in our data. Some (but not a majority) of 
companies break out single- and double-trigger payouts in their merger 
proxies. We are, however, able to identify firms that promise tax gross-
ups and also to construct indicator variables (1) where final golden 
parachute cash amounts are greater than three times the prior year’s 
cash compensation according to Execucomp, and (2) where CEOs 
experienced a golden parachute amendment during the year preceding 
the announcement of the merger.106 
 
 104. See Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 966. 
      105.  See discussion supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 106. We are able to observe amendments by reviewing public filings, generally 8-Ks, that call 
out Item 5.02 of Regulation S-K (Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; 
Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers), 10-Qs and 10-
Ks containing amendments as exhibits, and 8-Ks disclosing the merger where amendments to a 
GP are discussed. We do not capture ordinary course salary, bonus increases, or equity grants, all 
of which will affect GP amounts. Nor are we able to capture changes to terms of equity plans or 
merger provisions, both of which might call for different vesting provisions for unvested equity. 
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As noted, we predict that ISS’s SOGP recommendations will be 
significantly related to compensation concerns. We therefore include 
the final value disclosed for the CEO GP contract at the time of the 
shareholder vote and CEO Total Compensation to control for possible 
excessive compensation as well as indicators for Prior SOP Vote and 
Prior Compensation Activism to control for general dissatisfaction that 
may exist with pay arrangements at a firm. SOGP votes happen 
simultaneously with shareholder votes on the underlying deal, and it is 
possible that an SOGP recommendation might be influenced by ISS’s 
positive or negative view of the overall deal. Therefore, we also control 
for Deal Premium measured as the stock price one business day after 
the announced merger divided by the stock price twenty business days 
before the announcement. We include an indicator, ISS Against Merger, 
equal to one if ISS recommended against the merger.107 As measures of 
performance, we include Abnormal Returns and ROA. We include these 
variables because proxy advisors (and their shareholder clients) may be 
more willing to agree to high GPs in the face of recent good performance 
by management as something of a parting gift common in the relational 
contracting literature.108 Finally, we also control for size and ownership 
structure. 
Table 5 presents our results. Final golden parachute amounts 
are significantly correlated with ISS “against” recommendations. We 
also find a significant positive relationship between ISS “against” 
recommendations and firms with golden parachutes in the highest 
quartile. This suggests that ISS applies its “excessive golden parachute” 
criteria based not only on the absolute size of the golden parachute but 
also on a relative basis. Firm performance seems to have an uncertain 
relation to ISS recommendations, with ROA quartiles exhibiting the 
expected sign but not showing statistical significance. We find some 
evidence that higher deal premiums may cause ISS to recommend 
“against” less frequently. ISS claims that recent amendments to golden 
parachutes may be weighted more heavily in its analysis, but we find 
no significant relationship between recent amendments and ISS 
“against” recommendations. 
In the context of Say-on-Pay votes, Ertimur et al. (2013) found 
by reviewing ISS recommendation reports that tax gross-up provisions 
 
Thus, our GP Amendment variable necessarily undercounts the number of cases in which the 
terms of a GP have changed during the run-up to a deal. 
 107. We found “against” merger recommendations for eleven deals, or less than 2% of the 
sample. In those cases, ISS recommended voting in favor of the GP in seven cases and against the 
GP in three cases. 
      108.  See, e.g., Baker & Choi, Contract’s Role, supra note 25; Baker & Choi, Reputation and 
Litigation, supra note 25. 
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in golden parachutes were the only feature that suggested ISS adopts a 
one-size-fits-all approach to those SOP votes.109 With respect to SOGP 
recommendations, we unsurprisingly find strong evidence that 280G 
gross-up provisions are significantly related to ISS “against” 
recommendations.110 Combined with the earlier discussed relationship 
between “against” recommendations and highest quartile golden 
parachutes, there appears to be more evidence of a one-size-fits-all 
approach to SOGP votes, albeit one that is consistent with the SOP 
experience.111 
 
TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF PROXY ADVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO Golden Parachute 0.039***      
 (0.002)      
Q1 CEO Golden Parachute  
   (Smallest Quartile) 
 -0.293   -0.296  
 (0.518)   (0.507)  
Q4 CEO Golden Parachute  
   (Largest Quartile) 
 0.825**   0.838**  
 (0.045)   (0.040)  
Q1 ROA (Worst Quartile)  0.205   0.193  
  (0.583)   (0.604)  
Q4 ROA (Best Quartile)  -0.516   -0.518  
(0.195) (0.192) 
Q1 Abnormal Returns  
   (Worst Quartile) 
0.610 0.608 
(0.101) (0.102) 
Q4 Abnormal Returns  
   (Best Quartile) 
 -0.093   -0.119  
 (0.813)   (0.759)  
Low Abnormal Returns and  
   Large Golden Parachute 
  0.164   0.162 
  (0.842)   (0.844) 
Low ROA and Large Golden 
   Parachute 
  0.713   0.727 
  (0.117)   (0.104) 
ROA -1.151  -1.782 -2.107  -1.769 
 (0.490)  (0.274) (0.188)  (0.274) 
Abnormal Returns -0.533  -0.372 -0.412  -0.380 
 (0.347)  (0.517) (0.445)  (0.506) 
GP Cash > 3 X (Salary +  -0.213 -0.180 0.053 0.234 -0.147 0.092 
 
 109. Ertimur et al., supra note 5, at 968. 
 110. However, we find no evidence that excessive cash payments drive ISS recommendations. 
 111. We are not able to capture at least one of the factors that, according to ISS, determines 
its recommendation—single versus double triggers—which may complicate our data or tend to 
show another “automatic” against feature. Another variable that does seem to affect the ISS’s 
negative recommendation is the amount of institutional holdings: the larger the institutional 
holdings, the more likely that ISS will recommend against the SOGP. We are not entirely sure 
what drives this result, but one possible explanation relates to the fact that ISS’s clients are 
institutional shareholders.  When a firm’s shares are mainly owned by institutions (compared to 
firms where institutional holdings are low), it is likely that ISS will conduct a more thorough 
examination of the golden parachutes and make a negative recommendation—rather than rubber-
stamping the proposed payment. 
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   Bonus) & Recent  
   Amendment 
(0.714) (0.763) (0.925) (0.673) (0.803) (0.870) 
Tax Gross-Up 1.513*** 1.650*** 1.623*** 1.706*** 1.641*** 1.613*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Total Compensation -0.000 0.000 0.000    
 (0.690) (0.688) (0.659)    
ln(MVE) -0.321** -0.246 -0.188 -0.051 -0.227 -0.166 
 (0.046) (0.122) (0.212) (0.682) (0.138) (0.240) 
CEO Tenure 0.015 0.011 0.010    
 (0.525) (0.653) (0.664)    
Prior SOP Vote 0.029 0.015 0.178 0.329 0.029 0.187 
 (0.967) (0.982) (0.796) (0.629) (0.967) (0.787) 
Prior Compensation  0.455 1.051 0.865 1.371 1.159 0.992 
   Activism (0.716) (0.384) (0.477) (0.241) (0.325) (0.400) 
Insider Holdings -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.974) (0.907) (0.954) (0.885) (0.939) (0.977) 
Institutional Holdings 0.019* 0.019** 0.021** 0.022** 0.019** 0.021** 
 (0.057) (0.046) (0.028) (0.025) (0.046) (0.028) 
ISS Against Merger -0.398 -0.307 -0.409 -0.697 -0.337 -0.449 
 (0.817) (0.854) (0.802) (0.679) (0.837) (0.782) 
Deal Premium -1.392 -1.401* -1.190 -1.049 -1.402* -1.196 
 (0.100) (0.088) (0.146) (0.183) (0.086) (0.141) 
Recent Amendment 0.744 0.673 0.498 0.381 0.642 0.462 
 (0.198) (0.252) (0.377) (0.494) (0.269) (0.408) 
Constant -2.077 -1.960 -2.704 -3.601* -1.942 -2.707 
(0.364) (0.387) (0.218) (0.085) (0.387) (0.211) 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 263 263 263 263 263 263 
Chi-square 60.107 57.014 52.803 48.763 56.629 52.405 
Prob < Chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.182 0.172 0.160 0.147 0.171 0.158 
P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05. 
C. Shareholder Voting 
We next turn to shareholder voting on SOGP itself. Average 
shareholder SOGP dissent was 9.4% in 2011 and peaked at 17.1% in 
the limited sample from 2017. During the five years in between, SOGP 
dissent remained relatively constant at approximately 13%. In 
untabulated results, firms experienced dissent greater than 40% in 
14.4% of SOGP votes and dissent greater than 20% in 32.2% of such 
votes.112 Although average dissent is well below 50% and there are 
relatively few instances of threshold-breaching dissent at particular 
firms, these levels of dissent are considerably higher than those in SOP 
votes described above. 
 
 112. In the smaller Execucomp Sample, we see higher levels of dissent: 20.7% of firms 
experience greater than 40% dissent and 39.6% of firms experience greater than 20% dissent. 
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Similar to proxy advisor recommendations, we estimate an OLS 
regression with the percent of overall shareholder votes that dissent as 
the dependent variable. Again, we control for the final value disclosed 
for the CEO GP contract at the time of the shareholder vote, with CEO 
Total Compensation, Prior SOP Vote, and Prior Compensation Activism 
as compensation-related factors that might affect shareholder voting. 
Additionally, we continue to control for Deal Premium, firm 
performance, firm size, and ownership structure. We include indicator 
variables for ISS Against Merger and ISS Against GP 
recommendations. 
Table 6 shows, unsurprisingly, that ISS “against” 
recommendations are strongly correlated with shareholder dissent. In 
untabulated results, our 66.5% R-square result drops to approximately 
10% when we drop the ISS Against variable.113 Moreover, ISS Against 
appears to be economically significant. On average, after controlling for 
all the other variables, the percent of dissenting votes is 32.4% higher 
if ISS offers a negative recommendation. Once we take into account 
ISS’s recommendations, the effect of tax gross-ups in GPs on 
shareholder negative votes disappears and, in one specification, turns 
significant (at the 10% level) and negative, suggesting that shareholders 
care less about gross-ups than does ISS. Also, to the extent that ISS’s 
recommendations seem closely related with Deal Premium, the effect of 
the deal premium also loses its statistical significance in shareholder 
votes. Perhaps most interesting are variables that become significant, 
even when controlling for ISS “against” recommendations. The amount 
of the golden parachute is significantly and positively related to 
shareholder dissent, albeit at a level that may be economically 
insignificant. These findings suggest that shareholders may attempt to 
discipline CEOs with high golden parachutes more than ISS would 
otherwise recommend. Further, shareholders appear to give high-




 113. It is possible that these findings are subject to omitted variable bias as we are not able to 
capture single-trigger provisions in our data. Shareholders may be responding to these provisions 
and not to ISS recommendations and we are not able to tease those stories apart. 
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TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF DISSENTING SHAREHOLDER VOTES 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ISS Against 0.324*** 0.328*** 0.332*** 0.332*** 0.328*** 0.331*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Golden Parachute 0.001**      
 (0.025)      
Q1 CEO Golden Parachute 
   (Smallest Quartile) 
 -0.009   -0.010  
 (0.680)   (0.640)  
Q4 CEO Golden Parachute  
   (Largest Quartile) 
 0.007   0.009  
 (0.725)   (0.673)  
Q1 ROA (Worst Quartile)  -0.021   -0.020  
  (0.266)   (0.274)  
Q4 ROA (Best Quartile)  -0.047**   -0.046**  
  (0.015)   (0.017)  
Q1 Abnormal Returns  
   (Worst Quartile) 
 0.009   0.008  
 (0.647)   (0.654)  
Q4 Abnormal Returns  
   (Best Quartile) 
 -0.005   -0.003  
 (0.785)   (0.875)  
Low Abnormal Returns  
   and Large Golden   
   Parachute 
  -0.032   -0.033 
  (0.468)   (0.450) 
Low ROA and Large  
   Golden Parachute   0.014   0.015 
   (0.551)   (0.496) 
ROA -0.024  -0.045 -0.052  -0.042 
 (0.768)  (0.586) (0.517)  (0.605) 
Abnormal Returns 0.001 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 
(0.965) (0.942) (0.875) (0.971) 
Tax Gross-Up -0.035* -0.028 -0.028 -0.027 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.060) (0.131) (0.131) (0.138) (0.119) (0.120) 
CEO Total Compensation -0.000 0.000 0.000    
 (0.637) (0.905) (0.886)    
ln(MVE) -0.012* -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.093) (0.298) (0.405) (0.541) (0.306) (0.419) 
CEO Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (0.407) (0.301) (0.366)    
Prior SOP Vote 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.017 
 (0.675) (0.645) (0.580) (0.568) (0.696) (0.627) 
Prior Compensation  
   Activism -0.021 0.020 -0.005 0.006 0.021 -0.003 
 (0.736) (0.760) (0.935) (0.919) (0.735) (0.958) 
Insider Holdings -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.295) (0.387) (0.358) (0.311) (0.374) (0.349) 
Institutional Holdings -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.841) (0.993) (0.910) (0.951) (0.988) (0.918) 
ISS Against Merger 0.023 0.024 0.016 0.014 0.025 0.017 
 (0.741) (0.724) (0.818) (0.835) (0.719) (0.810) 
Deal Premium 0.000 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.013 
 (0.989) (0.623) (0.698) (0.675) (0.616) (0.687) 
Constant 0.194** 0.174* 0.145 0.121 0.161* 0.132 
 (0.037) (0.071) (0.117) (0.165) (0.091) (0.143) 
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 254 254 254 254 254 254 
R-square 0.665 0.666 0.658 0.656 0.665 0.657 
P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05 
Choi_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2020  7:28 AM 
2020] GOLDEN PARACHUTES 257 
D. Changes in Golden Parachutes over Time and Golden Parachute 
Amendments 
As discussed earlier, SOGP may be materially different from 
SOP, most notably because there is no second stage opportunity to 
discipline directors or executives who fail to respond to SOGP concerns 
or dissent. This suggests that the SOGP vote rule and individual SOGP 
votes could have relatively little (or no) impact on golden parachute 
practices. To determine whether SOGP has had an effect on golden 
parachutes, we first look to see whether firms adjusted their golden 
parachute practices upon the advent of SOGP. If SOGP was able to 
effectively harness shareholder outrage, particularly in controlling the 
size of golden parachutes, we should see reductions in golden parachute 
dollar values, incidence, or both. If SOGP was inconsequential, we 
would see no trend in particular. 
 
FIGURE 1: GOLDEN PARACHUTE VALUES AND RATIOS BY YEAR 
 
 
In fact, Figure 1 graphically represents how golden parachutes 
have evolved over the past ten years or so. Solid and long-dashed lines 
(at the top and at the bottom) plot the average (mean) and median sizes 
of golden parachutes, respectively, and they are subject to the scale at 
the left margin, where the unit of measurement is $2,000. Two short-
dashed lines (in the middle of the figure), subject to the scale at the 
right margin, plot average (mean) and median ratios of golden 
parachutes to annual salary. Even without any systematic analysis, the 
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figure shows that all lines seem to be growing over time and there seems 
to be no discernable slowdown after Dodd-Frank—that is, after July 
2010. 
Turning to a more systematic analysis, Table 7 reports the 
regression coefficients and shows that golden parachutes (in terms of 
their absolute size) are systematically larger after 2010. Columns 1 and 
2 in Table 7 use golden parachute value as the dependent variable. 
Columns 3 and 4 use the ratio of golden parachute value to total CEO 
compensation as the dependent variable. The strong results in columns 
1 and 2 show that the values of golden parachutes increased following 
SOGP.114 The weaker results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that this 
increase may have occurred at the same time as overall CEO 
compensation increased. Our results control for year effects, industry 
effects, firm size, firm performance, CEO compensation, and CEO 
tenure.115 We also control for the small subset of firms without golden 
parachutes in 2006 and 2007 to ensure our inference is not being driven 
by late golden parachute adoptions. 
It is difficult to estimate the precise point in time when SOGP 
became a likely requirement, as the change was introduced into Dodd-
Frank legislation in 2009 and final rules were promulgated in 2011. For 
robustness, we confirm in untabulated results that our results are not 
sensitive to whether the “post” period is defined as post-2010 or post-
2011. In additional, untabulated robustness tests, we confirm that our 
results are not sensitive to controlling for firm size using book assets 




 114. When we focus only on the top 10% (in terms of absolute size) of the golden parachutes, 
the results are even more robust. 
 115. Our results are not sensitive to whether the model is estimated as a fixed-effect model, a 
random-effect model, or as a pooled-OLS model. 
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TABLE 7: GOLDEN PARACHUTE INCIDENCE AND VALUES PRE- AND POST-
SOGP RULE116 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post  4.686*** 3.813** 0.320 0.341 
   (Indicator for Years 2011–2017) (0.005) (0.021) (0.159) (0.129) 
ln(Book Assets) 3.671*** 4.273*** 0.106*** 0.099*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Tenure 0.168*** 0.191*** -0.012** -0.011** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.013) (0.016) 
ROA 20.733*** 12.751*** -0.301 -0.155 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.331) (0.621) 
CEO Total Compensation 0.069 0.061 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.287) (0.301) (0.204) (0.211) 
Indicator for Firm Having GP in  7.979*** 7.630*** 1.641*** 1.595*** 
   2006 or 2007 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -27.720*** -32.990*** 0.427** 0.508 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.545) 
Industry Controls No Yes No Yes 
Year Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 20,652 20,613 20,602 20,563 
R-square 0.181 0.219 0.086 0.100 
P-values in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
Finally, it is possible that SOGP was effective in shaping golden 
parachute practices, but not in the initial contract. SOGP only occurs in 
the context of a soon-to-close deal, offering firms and CEOs the ability 
to wait until a deal is closed to amend the golden parachute downward 
in the face of an imminent SOGP vote. The golden parachute 
information has to be disclosed in part in annual proxy statements, but, 
given that annual proxy statements contain lots of other information, 
golden parachute-related information may well be dominated by other 
compensation information when the deal is not expected in the near 
future. Nevertheless, to the extent that disclosing very generous golden 
parachute payments in the SOP process could subject the directors and 
 
 116. In the current setup, as the table indicates, we have included both year dummies and a 
separate dummy (indicator) variable (as seen on the first row), which distinguishes between the 
pre- and post-SOGP period. The advantage of using both types of indicator variables is that, while 
the year dummies will control for the annual fluctuations in golden parachutes, pre- and post-
dummy will pick up the difference that stems from the change in law. For the results reported in 
Table 7, indicators for both years 2006 and 2017 were not included as controls to avoid collinearity 
issues. To ensure our inference is not dependent on this modeling assumption, we corroborate our 
inferences using a few other untabulated specifications: (1) with only the pre- and post-2010 
dummy without specific year controls and (2) with only the year dummies. It turns out that the 
substantive results are the same. In fact, with only the year dummies, the joint significance (on 
the coefficient estimates for the years after 2010 or after 2011) is significant at the 1% level and 
all the year coefficients are positive, corroborating our inference from the results in Table 7. 
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executives to future disciplinary forces, one would suspect that, given 
the absence of such forces in the SOGP votes, the managers are more 
likely to amend golden parachutes in the final proxy. Furthermore, 
amendments to golden parachutes leading up to an SOGP vote could 
possibly reflect managerial power of CEOs to extract private benefits 
during the last-period deal process. 
To estimate the possibility of this delayed consequentiality, we 
separate our Execucomp Sample into two groups: firms at which we 
found golden parachute amendments during the period beginning one 
year prior to the signing of the merger agreement through the SOGP 
vote (138 firms) and all other firms (141 firms).  
We find that nonamending firms had promised CEOs higher 
golden parachutes during the period before the deal than amending 
firms. This is consistent with the view that CEOs use the amendment 
process to augment relatively low golden parachutes. More tellingly, we 
find that firms experiencing golden parachute amendments saw 
increases in awards over the prior fiscal year’s of 39% compared with 
increases of 21% at nonamending firms. Recall that it is difficult to 
determine how much of the year-over-year increase in golden parachute 
awards is due to rising equity prices associated with a deal. That 
complication should disappear in this analysis as both amending and 
nonamending firms should experience similar equity price increases. 
The almost double increase in golden parachute awards for amending 
firms suggests that amendments are not entered into to respond to 
potential shareholder dissent via SOGP, but rather as a way for firms 
to increase executive compensation. Of course, it is possible that these 
firms would have amended golden parachutes upwards anyway for 
firm-specific reasons and SOGP may have constrained them to augment 
those awards less than they might have otherwise. 117 In Table 8, the 
benchmark year information is provided to give a sense of how the 
golden parachute values change. The benchmark year is the fiscal year 





 117. In separate tests we check to see if there are meaningful differences between the firms 
that ultimately amend and those that do not across commonly used variables on firm and CEO 
characteristics. Along these lines, we only find that firms that ultimately amend their GPs tend to 
have longer-tenured CEOs as of the beginning of the two-year period before a deal. This may mean 
that more entrenched CEOs are better able to extract augmentations ahead of deals. Alternatively, 
it may mean that amending CEOs were employed under more “stale” contracts with off-market 
GP promises. 
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TABLE 8: GOLDEN PARACHUTE AMENDMENTS 
 





Firms Without Amendments      
 DEF 14A Total Value 20,536.21 3,812.38 14,044.64 44,910.76 141 
 DEF 14A Cash 6,075.70 1,036.25 4,600.00 11,155.94 141 
 DEF 14A Equity 12,825.56 957.73 8,028.19 30,341.46 141 
 DEF 14A Perks Benefits 294.22 0.00 46.48 212.17 140 
 
Execucomp GP  
(Year of Vote) 18,604.42 3,388.00 13,116.34 39,869.23 134 
 
Execucomp GP  
(Benchmark Year) 17,327.10 3,388.00 11,325.91 39,053.35 138 
 
Execucomp GP  
(Benchmark Year-1) 16,876.76 2,464.92 10,997.76 34,596.92 134 
 
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value 
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp 
GP (Benchmark Year) 2.06 0.69 1.21 2.34 134 
 
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value 
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp 
GP (Benchmark Year-1) 2.22 0.66 1.25 2.79 129 
Firms With Amendments      
 DEF 14A Total Value 21,214.84 4,243.49 15,196.94 43,856.29 138 
 DEF 14A Cash 6,930.60 962.3 5,324.60 14,641.23 138 
DEF 14A Equity 12,508.08 1,005.99 8,557.51 27,643.61 138 
DEF 14A Perks Benefits 89.3 0.00 35.36 198.53 138 
 
Execucomp GP  
(Year of Vote) 17,420.64 1,697.35 12,758.23 40,214.38 132 
 
Execucomp GP  
(Benchmark Year) 14,949.40 1,434.27 11,112.69 32,452.60 132 
 
Execucomp GP  
(Benchmark Year-1) 13,897.92 1,190.95 10,509.81 31,625.00 128 
 
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value 
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp 
GP (Benchmark Year) 5.29 0.70 1.39 4.64 125 
 
Ratio of DEF 14Total Value 
(Year of Vote) to Execucomp 
GP (Benchmark Year-1) 2.61 0.66 1.63 5.66 121 
 
III. MAKING SOGP MORE EFFECTIVE 
For those who believe that golden parachutes generally reflect 
the result of arms-length bargaining and are therefore apt to be 
efficient, the ineffectiveness of SOGP in constraining them is little or 
no cause for concern. For those in that camp, the greater tendency of (a) 
ISS to apply one-size-fits-all criteria to its recommendations and (b) 
shareholders to delegate voting decisions to ISS (or other proxy advisory 
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firms) in SOGP votes might be initially troubling. But the apparent 
unwillingness of firms to change their CEO contracts limits the 
problematic impact of those phenomena. For those who believe that 
golden parachutes are more pernicious, however, SOGP seems to be 
largely ineffective. Although the following policy suggestions are 
directed more at the latter camp, regardless of where one stands on the 
issue, there is still room for improvement by making SOGP more 
effective. The proposals focus on two large areas: (1) making SOGP 
binding and (2) attempting to harness the implicit and reputational 
effects on the target and acquiring companies’ directors. We discuss 
these in turn. 
A. Making SOGP Vote “Binding” 
The key features that prove problematic for SOGP are its 
advisory nature and that it necessarily occurs in the firm’s final period 
when no second-stage discipline of recalcitrant directors and CEOs is 
readily available. One possible solution would be to make SOGP (at 
least partially) binding. An important difference between SOP and 
SOGP is that while SOP asks the shareholders to vote on the previous 
year’s executive pay, SOGP is prospective, asking the shareholders to 
express their opinions on the parachute payments that are to be made 
once the change-in-control transaction closes in the (near) future.118 
Making the SOGP vote binding would attempt to utilize this important 
difference. 
In terms of how strongly the golden parachute payment would 
depend on the shareholder vote (or the trigger threshold), we can 
consider different degrees. One possibility is to put the shareholder vote 
on golden parachutes on par with the shareholder vote on the 
transaction by making the entire parachute payment depend on 
clearing the approval threshold. For instance, if the transaction 
requires the approval of at least a majority of the outstanding stock, 
SOGP can adopt the same threshold. Furthermore, if the golden 
parachute proposal fails to satisfy the threshold, the failure would deny 
the entire severance payment to the executives. Another possibility is 
to impose some type of supermajority denial (or submajority approval) 
structure or to deny the executives the portion of the payment that 
exceeds the golden parachute payment previously disclosed as part of 
an SOP vote. (Or these two approaches could be combined.) Under this 
 
 118. See discussion supra Section I.B. In order to implement this change, given that the federal 
securities law focuses on disclosure and does not (at least directly) deal with firm’s governance 
issues, we will have to make a necessary change in the corporate law. 
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proposal, the executives are still “guaranteed” some severance payment 
and the additional, amended payment will be denied only in 
“exceptional” cases, such as when more than two-thirds or three-
quarters of the shareholders disapprove the payment. 
With respect to making the SOGP vote binding, the most 
challenging aspect is dealing with the impact of the uncertainty a 
binding vote would impose on the target executives. Assuming that 
target CEOs require the insurance that golden parachutes provide, 
binding SOGP votes could possibly reduce the value of those provisions. 
Faced with substantial uncertainty, perhaps valuable deals would be 
missed, or perhaps CEOs would require more compensation in other 
corners of their employment contracts (such as their annual stock or 
other compensation). The uncertainty problem would be starker in a 
regime where the approval threshold is relatively high and when the 
failure to secure the threshold implies denial of the entire golden 
parachute payment. The problem could be substantially mitigated if the 
system utilized a supermajority disapproval threshold (e.g., more than 
two-thirds or three-quarters of shares must disapprove the GP 
payment) and, more importantly, if the approval is with respect to only 
the additional, incremental portion. 
Even under the existing regulatory structure, firms and 
executives can increase the certainty of golden parachutes by getting 
approval for those promises (even the ones about additional 
compensation) in the immediately prior SOP disclosure and vote. In 
fact, as described above, the potential for avoiding an SOGP vote by a 
prior cleansing SOP vote preceded by enhanced golden parachute 
disclosure is a feature of the law.119 It is noteworthy that few if any 
firms have employed this procedure since SOGP came into effect.120 If 
SOGP was binding such that a failed SOGP vote led to the loss of 
valuable golden parachute promises, firms and their CEOs would 
surely utilize this safety valve.  
Effectively moving the SOGP vote forward into the prior year’s 
SOP vote is not without problems, however. Most importantly, it could 
limit the ability of firms to enter into new golden parachutes or 
amendments to preexisting golden parachutes immediately prior to a 
deal. If they did so, those new provisions would require and be subject 
to a binding SOGP vote. Our results suggest that most of these 
amendments are increasing payouts to CEOs, but we do not know 
whether those increases are efficient. 
 
 119. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
      120.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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Second, folding SOGP into a previous SOP vote runs the risk of 
bundling different features of a compensation package. Golden 
parachutes that might be objectionable enough for shareholders to vote 
against in isolation may not be objectionable enough to justify a vote 
against a CEO’s entire pay package. Still, the evidence on SOP votes 
shows that golden parachute features (tax gross-ups) influence the 
recommendations of ISS and shareholder voting. Moreover, even if 
bundling causes golden parachutes to be relatively less salient, the 
alternative is an advisory SOGP vote that apparently has little effect 
on CEO contracting at all. 
B. Harnessing Implicit and Reputational Mechanisms 
Another possible avenue of making the SOGP vote more effective 
is to focus on possible implicit and reputational mechanisms against the 
directors. While it is true that the target company directors and 
executives are no longer likely to serve the combined entity for large, 
publicly traded companies, it is well known that many directors serve 
on multiple boards.121 Hence, even when the target firm is disappearing 
through a change-in-control transaction, many of the target company 
directors will continue serving as directors at other firms. If, for 
instance, the fact that the target directors approved an outrageous 
golden parachute payment that was voted down by a large majority of 
target shareholders is known or disclosed to the other firms where the 
target directors continue their service, such information could play an 
important role in their reelection possibilities.122 If so, this could exert 
some pressure on the target directors to disapprove outsized golden 
parachute payments (or to disapprove amendments at the last minute 
in favor of the executives). A similar logic could also apply to departing 
target executives, who would continue serving as executives at other 
firms or would do so in the future. Disclosing such information could 
potentially reduce the target executives’ attractiveness in the labor 
market.123 
 
 121. See Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Outside Directors’ Protection, 
46 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 140–52 (2017) (documenting the frequency of directors serving on multiple 
boards and showing how such board interlocks can function as a propagation mechanism). 
 122. See Baker & Choi, Reputation and Litigation, supra note 25, at 47–48 (explaining that 
legal mechanisms can provide relevant information to market participants so as to facilitate 
market-based reputational incentives). 
 123. A supplementary mechanism might be to require the target directors to justify the 
parachute payments when they receive substantial negative votes from the shareholders. 
Currently, the target directors can simply go ahead and make the GP payments, even when a large 
majority of shareholders object under SOGP, without providing any explanation whatsoever. By 
requiring them to offer proper justifications on why they are not being responsive to the target 
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Another possibility is to focus on the directors and executives of 
the acquiring corporation. Although in many cases the acquiring 
corporation’s shareholders do not get to vote on the transaction,124 if the 
fact that the target executives received outsized severance payments (at 
least part of which is borne by the acquiring corporation) is disclosed to 
the acquiring corporation’s shareholders, they could impose some 
discipline against their own directors, who, in turn, might become more 
hesitant in agreeing to a large golden parachute in deal negotiations. 
Especially when the severance pay would trigger negative tax 
consequences, such as nondeduction of payment or additional excise 
liability combined with a tax gross-up, highlighting such negative 
consequences to the acquiring corporation’s shareholders could induce 
them to become more vigilant regarding the target executives’ golden 
parachute payments. 
Of course, nothing in the current SOGP regime prevents these 
sorts of soft sanctions from being imposed. SOGP votes and the 
underlying contractual promises are already public but not readily 
available to the shareholders of interlock or acquiring corporations. 
Under the current regime, shareholders or their advisors would have to 
focus on such voting results independently or have their attention 
drawn to such matters by disclosure requirements that call for 
information about happenings at (a) directors’ interlocked firms and (b) 
acquired firms, respectively. Our proposals would make it easier for the 
shareholders at interlocked or acquiring corporations to obtain 
information about the GP payments and SOGP votes at target 
companies. 
CONCLUSION 
The appropriate role for shareholders in monitoring executive 
compensation has proven to be a durable controversy in corporate law 
and corporate governance. In particular, shareholder voting on 
executive compensation has proliferated of late and has led to 
surprising consequences in some instances. This Essay extends the 
analysis of shareholder voting to a previously unexplored area—Say On 
Golden Parachute. The empirical analyses conducted to this point on 
Say on Pay have shown generally positive results for shareholder 
 
shareholders’ disapproval, and by disclosing such information to the other shareholders (for whom 
the target directors also serve on the board), we can further boost the implicit disciplinary 
mechanism. 
 124. This is largely due to the fact that an acquiring corporation would utilize a wholly owned 
subsidiary to merge with (or acquire shares of) the target corporation in a triangular structure. 
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involvement in the compensation process despite SOP being merely 
advisory. 
Our analysis of the experience with SOGP is not as positive. We 
find little evidence that SOGP is having significant effects on golden 
parachute contracting. Foremost, we show that since the adoption of 
SOGP, the incidence and dollar values of golden parachutes have 
increased. We find little evidence that firms resisted amending their 
golden parachutes downward until a vote was imminent. In fact, we 
find that firms facing imminent votes that amended their golden 
parachutes experienced greater year-over-year award increases than 
did firms that did not amend. 
There are also softer signs of SOGP’s inconsequentiality. 
Shareholders appear more willing to follow ISS vote recommendations 
than they do in the SOP context. This sort of “blind” adherence makes 
sense and is quite rational if shareholders do not value SOGP. 
Shareholders also appear to bundle considerations of previous firm 
performance with SOGP votes, an approach that does not seem 
coherent given the premise of SOGP. Finally, ISS voting 
recommendations seem to adopt more of a one-size-fits-all approach, 
turning on the presence of tax gross-ups and the golden parachute 
reaching a threshold level. This streamlined approach is susceptible to 
numerous interpretations, but perhaps the most charitable is that the 
proxy advisory firm is economizing on its decisionmaking process with 
respect to a decision it deems relatively unimportant. 
This apparent inconsequentiality is not simply due to SOGP’s 
advisory nature. Experience with SOP seems to show that advisory 
votes can work in certain circumstances. SOGP’s apparent failure to 
constrain golden parachutes suggests that the differences between the 
two regimes, in particular SOGP’s “last-period” nature, make such 
provisions an inapt target for an advisory mechanism. In tackling these 
two issues—SOGP’s nonbinding nature and the last-period problem—
we propose several policy measures that attempt to at least mitigate 
the problems, including making SOGP (at least partially) binding and 
also utilizing implicit discipline mechanisms against the directors of the 
target and acquiring companies. None of the proposals are free from 
possible challenges, however. We have addressed some of those above 
but recognize that deep disagreements about shareholder power over 
executives remain. 
 
